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 Part I Sources of Law 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
by Maurizio Pedrazza Gorlero – Matteo Nicolini 
58. The Italian legal system belongs to the civil law legal tradition, and therefore rests on 
a codified system of rules serving as the primary source of law. As a consequence, the 
primary source of Italian law is created by national and subnational legislatures in the 
form of legislation. Although the Italian legal system is mainly codified, custom is a 
source of law as well. But it cannot run counter to the application of legislation nor 
originate legal norms conflicting with written provisions (custom secundum legem). 
This means that custom cannot act contra legem. To put it another way, customary 
law can only fill in gaps left by written law, and, where it is found to be legitimate, it 
may merely integrate written legislation (custom praeter legem). If it were the case, 
custom satisfies the requirements in order to be recognised as a source of law. A 
typical example of custom secundum legem is trade custom, i.e., a practice adopted 
in business and mercantile transaction that has such regularity of observation in a 
place as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the 
transaction in question. Trade custom complements written legislation, providing 
that law explicitly refers to it (Article 8, General Provisions of the 1942 civil code). 
Custom is also a source of law at the constitutional level; the topic has been debated 
by scholars. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognise room for its existence. Firstly, the 
Constitution does not lay down a detailed regulation of all the relevant aspects of the 
State organisation. Thus, custom can integrate the black-letter constitution. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court credited the existence of customs at the 
constitutional level in the case of constitutional organs’ financial records, no-
confidence motion towards a single minister, and parliamentary legislative process.1 
59. The Constitution does not list all the sources of law. An incomplete list can be found 
in Articles 1–4 of the General Provisions of the Civil Code enacted in 1942 – i.e., prior 
to the Constitution – which do not take into account the sources of law subsequently 
introduced by the same Constitution. Articles 1–4 of the General Provisions of the 
Civil Code arrange the sources of law on a hierarchical scale, which is based on their 
                                                          
1 See CC n. 129/1981, n. 7/1996, and n. 140/2008 respectively. 
legal force. Thus, we find statutes, regulations, corporative norms, and customs. 
Provisions referring to corporative norms are no longer in force, since they were 
repealed after the defeat of Fascism and the dismantling of its corporative system.2 
Corporative norms should now be replaced by collective labour agreements under 
Article 39 of the Constitution. This provision, however, has never been implemented 
(see above, General Introduction Chapter 2). 
60. The Constitution does not lay down a comprehensive list of the sources of law of the 
Italian legal system. Indeed, the constitutional text only refers to primary legislation 
and constitutional laws. Unlike the Statuto Albertino, the 1948 Constitution has 
experienced a remarkable increasing in the number of sources of law. For instance, 
the Constitution added new sources at the constitutional level, having a force 
superior to that of the acts of Parliament, such as constitutional statutes amending 
the Constitution and constitutional statutes that are not formally incorporated in the 
body of the Constitution. Moreover, as Italy has a regional framework, the 
Constitution distributes legislative powers between the national and regional orders 
of government (Article 117 of the Constitution). Furthermore, the Constitution sets 
ad hoc sources, i.e. sources that regulate specific subjects, such as the relationships 
between the State and the Catholic Church (Article 7, II), as well as between the State 
an other religious denominations (Article 8, III). In other words, Italy has a pluralistic-
oriented constitution: there are numerous legal sources, and several entities are 
entitled to legislate. 
61. The sources of law the Constitution sets forth are mainly constitutional statutes and 
primary legislation. Parliament is not allowed to introduce any other primary sources 
of law. If it intends to do so, it has to change the Constitution by resorting to the 
constitutional amending formula set forth in Article 138 of the Constitution. In 
addition, the Constitution does not regulate secondary or subordinate legislation that 
is made by the executive to whom Parliament has delegated part of its law-making 
power. The sole references to subordinate legislation are to be found in Articles 87 
and 116, VI, of the Constitution. Whereas Article 87 refers to the enactment of 
executive regulations by the President of the Republic, Article 116, VI, allots 
subordinate legislation powers among the different tiers of government. As a 
consequence, secondary legislation is ‘open’ to changes and integrated by 
subsequent acts of the legislative branch. The subordinate legislative process and all 
                                                          
2 See the Royal Decree-Law n. 721/1943 e the Order in Council enacted by the Lieutentant of 
the Kingdom n. 369/1944. 
types of regulations can be found in Law No. 400/1988, as amended by Law No. 
69/2009. At the regional level, regional basic laws regulate secondary legislation, 
whereas bylaws are the means through which local authorities can make binding 
rules under such enabling legislation as Article 7 of the Legislative Decree No. 
267/2000. 
62. Such a high number of sources of law may be classified according to different criteria, 
which are particularly useful in order to solve antinomies between conflicting norms. 
There are three criteria for solving antinomies: the chronological criterion, the 
hierarchical criterion, and the criterion of competence. The chronological criterion 
applies between laws enacted by the same legislative body, or between laws with 
general or equal competence and rank: between statutes of the National Parliament; 
between two statutes of the same Regional Legislature; between a statute of 
Parliament and acts with force of law (legislative decrees, decree laws, etc.). If there 
are two inconsistent or conflicting statutes, the latter repeals the earlier to the extent 
of the inconsistency (lex posterior derogat priori).3 
The hierarchical criterion applies between sources arranged on a hierarchical scale. 
The source of law with higher rank triggers the invalidity of the those with lower rank 
that are inconsistent with the former. For example, subordinate legislation must be 
consistent with primary legislation; where there is inconsistency between primary 
and subordinate legislation, the former prevails. 
The criterion of competence refers to sources of law, to which the Constitution 
confers the regulation of a specific matter to the exclusion of the others. For example, 
the internal organisation of the Houses of Parliament is a matter reserved to their 
own rules (Article 64 of the Constitution). A source without jurisdiction regulating a 
reserved matter is invalid and can be challenged before the Constitutional Court. In 
certain cases, it is necessary to apply different criteria in order to solve antinomies 
between sources of law. For instance, both the criterion of competence and the 
hierarchical criterion are applied to regulate the relationship between the acts o 
Parliament and regional laws. 
Chapter 2 External Sources: International Law 
by Maurizio Pedrazza Gorlero – Matteo Nicolini 
                                                          
3 See CC. n. 49/1970 and n. 63/1970. 
63. The Italian system is an ‘original’ one: it draws from itself its own effectiveness. In 
this respect, it considers the system of international law – as well as those of foreign 
countries – as separate. In order to incorporate international law into domestic law, 
legislative action is required. As a consequence, all international sources must be 
incorporated in order to produce legal effects in the domestic legal system. The 
Italian legal system is thus impermeable to legal rules laid down by external sources 
unless it allows them to acquire legal relevance within it. This entails a limitation of 
State sovereignty: such limitation works automatically when the same Constitution 
upholds such a possibility, such as in the case of international customary law (Article 
10, I, Constitution). As for international treaties, their incorporation requires 
legislation. The ranking given to international provisions depends on the provision 
incorporating the treaty. Thus, customary norms acquire quasi-constitutional 
ranking; international treaties enjoy the same ranking as the internal provisions. The 
Italian legal system has connections with the international, foreign, and the European 
legal systems. These connections are regulated by procedures and rules, and differ 
from each other in terms of importance and effectiveness. 
§1 INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO DOMESTIC LAW 
64. How international law is incorporated into the Italian legal system depends on the 
nature of the source. Thus, international customary law and international treaties are 
incorporated according to different procedures. 
§2 INCORPORATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
65. ‘Customary law’ is a source of law. On the one hand, it requires a general and 
consistent practice of States within the international community (‘objective 
component’: usus or diuturnitas). On the other hand, such practice is followed out of 
a sense of legal obligation: the international actors consider it to be law and observe 
it on the grounds of its binding legal effects (‘subjective component’: opinio juris ac 
necessitatis). 
Under Article 10, I of the Constitution, Italy automatically incorporates ‘the generally 
recognised tenets of international law’ (international customary rules) into its legal 
system. Pursuant to Article 10, I of the Constitution, incorporation of customary 
international law is then accomplished through a mechanism of automatic 
incorporation. It is what Italian jurisprudence calls ‘mobile’ (or ‘formal’) reference to 
the rules produced by international sources at customary level.  
It should be argued that ‘the generally recognised tenets of international law’ also 
refer to those international treaties and covenants on human rights protection, such 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These covenants set a common standard for the protection 
of human rights and may be considered a universal achievement for all peoples and 
all nations. However, the Constitutional Court does not uphold the assumption. In 
the Court’s opinion, Article 10, I, of the Constitution only refers to customary 
international law, and, to a lesser extent, those treaties that merely repeat principles 
and rules whose source can be traced back to customary international law.4 
Customary international rules (i.e. the domestic provisions which incorporate them) 
place themselves at an intermediate level between the Constitution and primary 
legislation. As a consequence, the internal sources incorporating international 
customary rules can be defined as ‘atypical’, because they enjoy a special rank vis-a-
vis ordinary primary legislation (i.e., an intermediate one). If customary rules and 
subsequent primary legislation are inconsistent, the former repeal the latter to the 
extent of the inconsistency. On the contrary, primary legislation that infringes 
customary international law is void and can be challenged before the Constitutional 
Court.5 
Furthermore, customary international law enjoys a status that is comparable to the 
Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court has traditionally distinguished between customs that had 
come into force prior to the Constitution and those that had come into force after 
the enactment of the same Constitution. The former usually prevailed over the 
Constitution according to the lex specialis rule. Customary rules enacted after the 
entry into force of the Constitution could not violate the ‘basic principles’ of the same 
constitutional system.6 
The Constitutional Court has recently stated that all customary international law 
must comply with the ‘basic principles’ of the constitutional system.7 To this extent, 
the Court found that the customary rule of state immunity from foreign jurisdictions 
could not infringe two fundamental core features of the Constitution: the protection 
                                                          
4 See CC. n. 15/1996; C.C. n. 393/2006. 
5 See CC n. 278/1992, 172/1999, 131/2001. 
6 See CC n. 48/1979. 
7 See CC n. 234/2014. 
of inviolable human rights (Article 2), and access to justice (Article 24). If it were the 
case – and this occurred as far as tort claims related to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity were concerned –, the automatic incorporation of customary 
international law into the Italian legal order would be limited by such fundamental 
constitutional principles. 
§3 INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 
66. Italy adopts a dualistic approach to international law, since it conceives international 
and domestic law as belonging to fundamentally separate legal orders. As a 
consequence, international treaties are sources of international law, but do not have 
effect in domestic law until they are incorporate by an Act of Parliament.  
Hence, international treaties require legislative action for their incorporation into the 
national legal system. Such incorporation needs either an Act of Parliament, which 
reproduces the provisions of the treaty (legge di esecuzione) or an Act, to which the 
treaty is annexed (ordine di esecuzione or enforcement clause). Whilst the former 
directly incorporates the treaty, the latter (enforcement clause) refers to the content 
of the annexed treaty. The enforcement clause is said to ensure a ‘fixed’ (or ‘material’ 
or ‘upon receipt’) reference to the specific provisions laid down by the international 
treaty. 
The Act of Parliament incorporating international treaties is an ordinary statute. As a 
consequence, it is hierarchically inferior only to constitutional sources, and may 
therefore be repealed by subsequent Acts of Parliament, notwithstanding the 
consequences for the State within the international system as a result of the repeal.8 
However, abrogative referenda cannot be held on Acts incorporating international 
treaties.9 This last assumption is held on the ground of the constitutional provision 
prohibiting laws authorizing the ratification of international treaties to be submitted 
to abrogative referenda (Article 75, II, of the Constitution). 
§4 INCORPORATION OF LATERAN PACTS 
67. According to Article 7, II, of the Constitution, Acts of Parliament incorporating the 
Lateran Pacts can be amended only by Parliament upon an agreement entered 
between the State and the Catholic Church. This is due to the mutual recognition of 
sovereignty of State and Church within their respective jurisdictions. To put it another 
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9 See CC n. 16/1978 and n. 26/1982. 
way, the Constitution regulates State-Church relations according to the so-called 
‘concordat’ principle. Thus, Article 7, II of the Constitution confers upon the Acts 
incorporating the Lateran Pacts a force of law that is superior to that of the other Acts 
of Parliament. Moreover, such Acts are able to depart from constitutional provisions 
that do not contain ‘the supreme principles of the constitutional system’,10 such as 
the principle of equal protection of the laws.11 
In addition, such Acts cannot be repealed by constitutional provisions, which do not 
contain the ‘supreme principles of the constitutional legal system’. As mentioned 
above, the amendment to the Pacts is an ‘atypical’ Act of Parliament, which must be 
preceded by an agreement between the State and the Catholic Church stipulated in 
an external legal system common to both. The Acts incorporating the Lateran Pacts 
have a force of law comparable to constitutional laws. In fact, the phenomenon of 
the ‘atypical’ sources consists of the separation of the form and the effectiveness of 
the source. As a consequence, the active force – i.e., the ability of innovation of the 
legal system – corresponds to a different resistance to abrogation (passive force). 
§5 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES BINDING PRIMARY LEGISLATION UNDER ARTICLE 117, I OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
68. Article 117, I of the Constitution, introduced by the constitutional act No. 3/2001, 
states that legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in 
compliance with international obligations. Article 117, I sets up an additional limit to 
State legislative power, since it treats international treaty obligations as hierarchically 
superior to statutory law. 
This limitation appended to primary legislation was originally laid down in the basic 
laws of the ‘Autonomous’ Regions.12 Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court held that 
all Regions were bound by international treaties and had to respect international 
obligations.13 
Scholars have long debated with respect to the question, whether Article 117, I, of 
the Constitution also binds State legislation. On the one hand, it should be argued 
that this Article simply reasserts what Article 10, I states with regard to international 
                                                          
10 See CC n. 30/1971. 
11 See CC n. 18/1982. 
12 Article 3, I, basic law for Sardinia; Article 2, I, basic law for Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste; Article 
4, I, basic law for Friuli Venezia-Giulia; Article 4, I, basic law for Trentino Alto-Adige/Südtirol. 
13 See CC n. 49/1963. 
customary law. On the other hand, however, Article 117, I, seems to treat 
international treaty obligations as hierarchically superior to both national and 
regional statutory laws. From this it does not follow, however, that this Article 
incorporates monism into the Italian Constitution. This provision does not 
automatically incorporate any external source of law, neither domestic nor 
international, but merely refers to the effects of the incorporation, i.e., to the binding 
effects of international obligations over the national legal system, as well as the 
interpretation of these effects by international and supranational tribunals. Article 1, 
I of the Law No. 131/2003 – which implements Article 117, I of the Constitution at 
the legislative level – holds the same assumption, as it expressly refers to both 
international customary law and international agreements, i.e., to all the external 
sources of international obligations binding the legislative power and that the 
Constitution includes in the constitutional bloc. 
In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, international treaties that bind primary 
legislation are only those consistent with the Constitution once they have been 
incorporated into domestic law. If the treaty matches the above-mentioned criteria, 
it can be incorporated into the constitutional bloc and used as a parameter for 
challenging the constitutional validity of primary legislation before the Constitutional 
Court. As a consequence, a statute held by the Constitutional Court to violate an 
international treaty under Article 117, I, of the Constitution lacks domestic legal force 
and is declared unconstitutional. Among the international treaties binding primary 
legislation, there is the European Convention on Human Rights.14 The Court also 
attaches binding effects to the interpretation of that treaty that is delivered by the 
European Court on Human Rights.15 Furtermore, the Court includes in the 
constitutional bloc the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC or 
UNCRC);16 the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (Strasbourg, 
25 January 1996);17 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).18 
                                                          
14 Among others, see CC nn. 348 and 349/2007, n. 39/2008, 331 and 317/2009, 93/2010, 
113/2011, 78/2012. 
15 Among others, see CC nn. 348 and 349/2007, n. 49/2015, n. 276/2016, n. 43/2017, n. 
43/2018. 
16 CC n. 7/2013, n. 239/2014, and n. 92/2018. 
17 CC n. 7/2013. 
18 CC n. 2/2016. 
§6 CONFLICT OF LAW RULES 
69. The relations between the Italian legal system and the legal systems of foreign 
countries are regulated by the so-called ‘conflict of law’ rules (or private international 
law rules). These are procedural rules set forth by Law No. 218/1995, which 
determines the legal system and the jurisdiction applicable to a specific dispute with 
a foreign element (e.g., a contract to be enforced in another country). According to 
the conflict of law rules, Italy governs the scope of its jurisdiction19 and detects which 
law is applicable for resolving the dispute.20 Moreover, it sets the proper regulation 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements. 
Chapter 3 European Sources 
by Maurizio Pedrazza Gorlero – Matteo Nicolini 
70. European sources of law are neither external nor domestic ones. In fact, they cannot 
be properly considered external sources, since European law may be regarded as a 
sui generis legal system. Although European law belongs to a legal system that is 
external to the Italian one, it may have a direct effect on Italian domestic law 
according to the principles of direct applicability and direct effect. In addition, 
European law prevails upon internal sources, according to a principle similar to that 
of competence. In other words, European law is supreme over national law, and 
anything contained in the EU treaties supersedes domestic legal provisions.21  
This peculiar relationship between European and domestic laws is due to the Italian 
dualist position which conceives EU and domestic law as belonging to separate legal 
orders, although coordinated as they share personal and territorial features.22 
According to the supremacy of EU law over domestic law, the parameters of the 
competence of the same EU are set by the treaties upon which is based. 
Article 1.2.b of Treaty of Lisbon (2007) states that the Union shall be founded on the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and that ‘The Union shall replace and succeed the European 
Community’. 
                                                          
19 Articles 3–5 of Law No. 218/1995. 
20 Articles 20–63 of Law No. 218/1995. 
21 CC n. 183/1973. 
22 CC n. 170/1984. 
§1 THE INCORPORATION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND OF THE TREATY ON THE 
FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (FORMER EEC TREATY) 
71. Upon Italy joining the then European Community, the treaties establishing the 
European Communities (now the TFEU), and their subsequent amendments23 were 
incorporated into Italian law by national legislation.24 
Such acts do not follow the principles that apply to the laws incorporating ‘ordinary’ 
international treaties. In fact, they cannot be repealed by an ordinary Act of 
Parliament. Moreover, EU treaties establish their own sources of law, which have to 
be subsequently enforced into the Italian legal system.  
The provisions of the treaties, which establish European sources of law, have a legal 
force that is comparable to that of the Constitution. This is due to Article 11 of the 
Constitution: under conditions of equality with other states, this article allows Italy 
to limit its sovereignty to the extent of the creation of a legal system that ensures 
peace and justice among Nations.25 Furthermore, Article 117, I, of the Constitution26 
states that Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in 
compliance with constraints deriving from EU-legislation, thus explicitly 
acknowledging the supremacy of EU law.  
However, EU treaties must comply with the ‘basic principles’ of the constitutional 
system, which cannot be infringed by EU sources of law.27 
Under the EU Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 
December 2000 (as amended on 12 December 2007) has the same legal value as the 
Treaties and therefore the same supremacy EU law enjoys within the Member States. 
The Constitutional Court has held so accordingly as well.28 
                                                          
23 The Merger Treaty 1965, Acts of Accession, budgetary Treaties, the Single European Act 1986, 
the Treaty on European Union 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, the Treaty of Nice 2000, 
and the Treaty of Lisbon 2007. 
24 Laws n. 766/1952, n. 1203/ 1957, n. 454/1992, n. 209/1998, n. 102/2002, n. 130/2008. 
25 See CC n. 227/2010. 
26 As amended by constitutional act No. 3/2001. 
27 CC n. 183/1973, and n. 170/1984. See also ECJ 05-12-2015 C n. 42/17. 
28 See CC n. 80/2011, n. 236/2016, and 269/2017. 
§2 THE RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN LAW 
72. EU primary legislation comprises the treaties incorporated by Parliament. European 
secondary legislation is passed by EU institutions under Article 161 EURATOM Treaty 
and Article 288 EU Treaty. 
Secondary legislation comprises ‘regulations’, ‘directives’ and ‘decisions.’ Article 288 
of the TFEU define these terms as follows: 
‘A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States’. 
‘A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State 
to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods. 
‘A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom 
it is addressed shall be binding only on them’. 
§3 EU REGULATIONS 
73. Article 11 of the Constitution has created a ‘legislative automatism’, which allows 
European regulations to supersede internal sources. This means that immediately 
upon its enactment, a regulation operates within Italian law, as if its own legislature 
had produced the measure and to the exclusion of domestic law. They are 
enforceable from the time of their creation and States do not have to pass any further 
legislation. This ‘legislative automatism’ inhibits the decisional power of the domestic 
source; as a consequence, domestic rules inconsistent with EU regulations become 
legally irrelevant.  
The relations between EU regulations and domestic statutes do not follow the criteria 
that govern antinomies between internal sources. The Constitutional Court played a 
pivotal role in shaping the relations between domestic law and European sources. 
The Italian Constitutional Court originally applied the chronological criterion, 
privileging the lex posterior.29 However, this thwarted the supremacy of European 
law. In a subsequent judgement, the Constitutional Court held that it was necessary 
to challenge the constitutional validity of Italian legislative provisions inconsistent 
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with European regulations.30 In so doing, the Constitutional Court was able to take 
under its control a source of legislation of an external system. The European Court of 
Justice harshly criticised this case law. Finally, the Constitutional Court configured the 
conflict between domestic laws and regulations as a ‘direct violation’ of European 
law.31 The Constitutional Court has eventually stated that regulations take 
precedence over previous and subsequent domestic legislation. Moreover, national 
courts must set aside domestic legislation inconsistent with European regulations 
and must apply the latter in their entirety. However, the Constitutional Court has the 
possibility to set aside national and regional legislation challenged in accordance with 
Article 127 of the Constitution, which sets the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
over legislative disputes between State and regions.32 This is also due to Article 117, 
I, of the Constitution: as already said, it treats EU sources of law as hierarchically 
superior to both national and regional statutory law. 
Nevertheless, it should be recalled that EU regulations enjoy a status that is 
comparable to the Constitution. However, they must respect the ‘basic principles’ of 
the constitutional system. If the EU regulations infringe the fundamental core 
features of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court may set aside the acts 
incorporating EU treaties to the extension of the inconsistency.33 
§4 EU DIRECTIVES 
74. EU directives bind only Member States, leaving no discretion as to their objectives. 
They state general goals and leave the precise implementation in the appropriate 
form to the individual Member States. As a consequence, some domestic legislative 
action is required for their implementation; legislation enacted in order to implement 
directives has a legal force that is superior to that of ordinary Acts of Parliament, since 
it can repeal previous laws and determine the invalidity of subsequent ones. It is then 
an ‘atypical’ source, which is not even subject to abrogative referenda. This is due to 
Article 117, I of the Constitution, which binds State and regional legislation to respect 
EU constraints and calls for compliance with EU law.34 
Some directives lay down obligations which are sufficiently clear and complete so 
that they are not subject to any exception and condition, and do not require 
                                                          
30 CC n. 232/1975. 
31 CC n. 170/1984. 
32 CC n. 384/1994, 94/1995, 102/2008; n. 66/2013, n. 171/2013; n. 269/2014; n. 38/2015. 
33 CC n. 170/1984. 
34 Among others, see CC n. 406/2005, n. 126/2006, n. 28/2010, n. 18/2012. 
intervention on the part of Member States. These directives have direct effect: 
individuals may rely on EU law in any action against the government without the need 
for their particular State to have passed the law within its own legal system. 
Therefore, they confer enforceable individual rights, and impose obligations upon 
individuals. Both the European Court of Justice and the Italian Constitutional Court 
have expressly acknowledged this,35 and held that directives can have a direct effect 
only between State and individuals.36 
§5 THE ANNUAL ACTS OF PARLIAMENT SETTING THE PROPER MEASURES FOR ENSURING THE 
FULFILLMENT OF EU OBLIGATIONS 
75. Law No. 234/2012 provides the legislative action required at the national level for 
implementing EU law. The statute provides us with two forms of legislative action for 
the precise implementation of EU law. These are the so-called ‘legge europea’, and 
the so-called ‘legge di delegazione europea’, i.e., annual Acts of Parliament, which set 
forth the proper measures for ensuring the fulfilment of EU Obligations.37 Under this 
Act, Parliament directly incorporates and implements directives and ECJ judgements 
and repeals primary legislation inconsistent therewith. In addition, Parliament can 
have recourse to both primary and subordinate delegated legislation.38 
Moreover, Law No. 234/2012 implements Article 117, V of the Constitution on the 
participation of Regions in the European decision-making process. Regions are 
enabled to incorporate EU directives in their fields of legislation in observance of 
procedures set forth by State law.39 In addition, an Act of Parliament sets the proper 
measures for the State to act in substitution of the regions if the latter do not fulfil 
EU obligations. Like the State, several Regions approve an annual act, which 
establishes the proper measures for ensuring the fulfilment of EU obligations.40 
State and regional Acts setting proper measures for ensuring the fulfilment of EU law 
have the same force and effect as the single act implementing EU directives.41 
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39 Article 40 Law No. 234/2012. 
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Chapter 4 Domestic Sources 
by Maurizio Pedrazza Gorlero – Matteo Nicolini 
§1 THE CONSTITUTION 
76. The Constitution is the fundamental law of Italy and provides the Republic with a 
comprehensive legal framework. It is hierarchically superior to all the domestic 
sources, the validity and force of which depend upon whether they are enacted 
according to the same Constitution. Furthermore, the Italian Constitution is 
‘entrenched’ or ‘rigid’: it sets forth the rules presiding the legislative process that has 
to be followed when it comes to amending its provisions. It also prevents the same 
provisions from being amended without respecting the constitutional amending 
formula enshrined in Article 138 of the Constitution. Procedures for constitutional 
amendments are thus more burdensome than those envisaged for ordinary laws. 
Some constitutional provisions cannot be amended or replaced: for example, Article 
139 states that ‘The form of Republic shall not be a matter for constitutional 
amendment.’ The ‘form of the Republic’ refers not only to the periodical election of 
the Head of State,42 but also to the pluralism which underpins the concept of 
constitutional democracy. Thus, it encompasses popular sovereignty, local and 
regional autonomy, the election of political representatives, freedom of thought, 
association, vote, and so on.43 Moreover, the rigidity of the Constitution puts 
constraints on both the constitutional and the ordinary legislators, and presupposes 
the judicial review of legislation.44 The Constitutional Court has indeed adhered to 
the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments: these are deemed to be 
unconstitutional if they infringe the basic features of the Constitution, such as 
‘inviolable rights’ and ‘supreme principles of the constitutional system’.45 
Constitutional core principles are hierarchically superior to any other source of law. 
It is called the ‘super’ or ‘nuclear’ Constitution, which comprises those constitutional 
provisions, which set the procedural and substantive limitation – explicit or implied – 
to constitutional amendments.  
                                                          
42 Articles 83 and 85 of the Constitution. 
43 Articles 1, 5, 56, 57, 21, 18, and 48 of the Constitution. 
44 Articles 1, 5, 56, 57, 21, 18, and 48 of the Constitution. 
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§2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS 
77. Article 138 of the Constitution sets forth a unitary legislative process for passing 
constitutional amendments and constitutional laws. Whereas constitutional 
amendments alter the text of the Constitution, the latter have a constitutional status 
but are not formally incorporated into the same Constitution. It is not easy to draw a 
divide between constitutional amendments and constitutional laws: they share 
common features and their fields of competence frequently overlap. 
Constitutional laws are set at the apex of the legal system. They can amend every 
constitutional provision with the exception of the ‘fundamental features’ of the 
Constitution. Constitutional laws cannot be submitted to abrogative referenda, since 
their amendment and repeal is envisaged provided it is set forth in Article 138 of the 
Constitution. 
There are also atypical acts at the constitutional level. These are: a) the constitutional 
laws that alter the territory of the Regions; b) the constitutional laws which adopt the 
basic laws of the ‘special’ Regions. 
I Constitutional Laws Providing the Territorial Alteration of the Regions 
78. Article 132, I, of the Constitution requires a constitutional act in order to create new 
regions, merge existing ones, incorporate a region into another one. The provision 
requires that new regions must be ‘vital’, as they must have a minimum of one million 
inhabitants.46 
The procedure laid down in the provision is extremely complex: a) the request for 
territorial alteration must be called for by a number of Municipal Councils 
representing not less than one-third of the populations concerned in the territorial 
regrouping; b) the population must consent to the alteration through referendum; c) 
Parliament approves the constitutional law; d) existing regions may express their 
views on the proposed territorial alteration. 
Thus, the Constitution provides a legislative process for creating constituent units. 
The process has recourse to a referendum, through which the regional population 
decides its own ‘self-identification’ as a regional community. As a consequence, 
alterations cannot be unilaterally approved by Parliament: it can only ascertain, upon 
a political basis, whether the criteria enabling territorial alteration are consistent 
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with Article 5 of the Constitution. If it were the case, Parliament may trigger the 
proposed alteration and therefore demarcate the self-determined new Region. 
II Constitutional Laws Adopting the Basic Laws of ‘Autonomous' Regions 
79. Article 131 of the Constitution establishes twenty regions, five of which (Trentino-
Alto Adige/Südtirol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Aosta Valley/Vallée d’Aoste, Sicily, and 
Sardinia) are denominated ‘autonomous’ regions.47 Autonomous regions enjoy a 
higher degree of self-regulation and their competences are enumerated in their own 
‘basic laws’ (statuti), which are approved by Parliament as acts at the constitutional 
level. As the institution of autonomous Regions corresponds to ethnic and 
geographical reasons, this type of constitutional laws has a specific object, a specific 
nomen juris: they are indeed denominated statuti speciali, i.e. special basic laws. 
Furthermore, they have a limited territorial jurisdiction: their territorial scope 
coincides with the regional territory. They are constitutional laws, which are not 
incorporated into the constitutional text. However, they complement constitutional 
provisions in order to provide autonomous regions with ‘special forms and conditions 
of autonomy’. They have, then, a special status, since they cannot amend all the 
constitutional provisions, but only those falling within their specific field of 
competence, i.e. the regulation of special regional autonomy. 
Constitutional laws adopting the basic laws of ‘Autonomous’ Regions are usually 
amended by subsequent constitutional acts. In some cases, however, they can be 
altered by regional laws. The constitutional amendment act n. 2/2001 grants 
autonomous Regions the ability to set their own form of government and electoral 
system: the act is approved by absolute majority of the members of the regional 
legislature. The Constitutional Court holds that such an act is an expression of 
regional constitutional autonomy.48 According to the constitutional amendment act 
n. 2/2001, the constitutional laws adopting the basic laws of ‘Autonomous’ Regions 
cannot be submitted to confirmative referendum under Article 138, II, of the 
Constitution. 
Moreover, the provisions concerning intergovernmental fiscal relations set forth in 
the special basic laws can be amended by passing either a constitutional act or an 
ordinary law of the State, provided that the latter is precede by an agreement 
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between the State and the Region concerned.49 The Acts of Parliament based on a 
State-Region agreement count as constitutional amendments.50 The same procedure 
applies when it comes to amending the governmental system of the ‘Autonomous’ 
Regions, by introducing, for example, the direct election of the regional presidents or 
the speaker of the regional legislature. 
Finally, article 10 of the constitutional amendment act n. 3/2001 provides a 
transitional provision: as long as Parliament does not amend the basic law of the 
special regions, it is possible to extend to them the broader forms of legislative and 
administrative autonomy that ordinary Regions enjoy under Title V of the 
Constitution.51 
§3 PRIMARY LEGISLATION 
I Acts of Parliament (or ‘Formal’ Laws) 
81. Parliament passes primary legislation according to Articles 70 ff. of the Constitution. 
The pieces of primary legislation are also called ‘formal’ laws: the phenomenon of 
the ‘typical’ sources indeed consists of the connection of the form (primary 
legislation) and the effectiveness of the source (i.e. the force of law). 
II Laws Granting Amnesty and Pardon 
82. ‘Amnesty’ and ‘pardon’ are acts of collective mercy whereby crimes are wiped out 
and sentences commutated, remitted or reduced. Pursuant to Article 79, II, of the 
Constitution, they are granted by an Act of Parliament, which has to be passed by 
two-thirds of the members of both Houses voting on each single article and on the 
statute as a whole. The act therefore requires the approval of both the ‘majority’ and 
the ‘opposition’, that is to say, the two subjects of parliamentary democracy. 
Due to the entrenched legislative process required for their approval, laws granting 
amnesty and pardon have a force of law which is superior to that required by the 
nature of the effect it produces, i.e., the ‘temporary suspension’ of the effectiveness 
of criminal law. Moreover, they cannot be repealed by an ordinary act of Parliament. 
If Parliament repealed an act granting pardon and amnesty, it would infringe the 
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50 CC n. 99/2014, n. 46, 77, 82/2015, and n. 28/2016. 
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Constitution. Laws granting pardon and amnesty cannot be submitted to abrogative 
referenda.52 
III The So-Called ‘Atypical’ Laws 
83. We have already examined ‘atypical’ legislation. Atypical acts of Parliament are 
usually the outcome of a legislative process which incorporates additional procedural 
stages within the parliamentary procedure. Such variation in the parliamentary 
procedure entrenches atypical laws: their force sets them in an intermediate position 
between the Constitution and ordinary legislation. As a consequence, they cannot be 
amended nor repealed by ‘ordinary’ primary legislation. 
The Constitution lays down several ‘atypical’ laws.  
Firstly, there are the laws incorporating the Lateran Pacts and their subsequent 
amendments, which we have examined above.53  
Secondly, an Act of Parliament may separate provinces and municipalities from a 
Region and aggregate them to another one.54 A referendum must be held in order to 
acquire the consent of the population of the sole municipalities and provinces 
concerned.55 Once the population of the provinces and municipalities concerned has 
approved the referendum, the Parliament can pass the act for territorial 
readjustment.56 As far as special Regions are concerned, changes in their territorial 
identity – even the minor ones – require a constitutional amendment.57 This is due to 
the fact that their basic laws, which were passed as acts at the constitutional level, 
have undoubtedly entrenched their territory.58 Despite this, in 2017 Parliament 
separated the municipality of Sappada/Plödn from the Veneto Region and 
                                                          
52 Article 75, II, of the Constitution. 
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54 Article 132, II, of the Constitution. 
55 CC n. 334/2004. 
56 See Article 132, II, of the Constitution. For an application see Law n. 117/2009, which 
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57 CC n. 66/2007. 
58 The regional territory is expressly demarcated by Article 1 basic law for Sardinia; Article 1, 
basic law for Sicily; Article 1, II, basic law for Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste; Article 1, 1, basic law 
for Friuli Venezia-Giulia (amended by constitutional law n. 172016); Article 3, basic law for 
Trentino Alto-Adige/Südtirol. 
aggregated it to the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region by passing a piece of ordinary 
legislation.59 
Thirdly, Parliament approves the laws incorporating the agreements between the 
State and non-Catholic religious denominations.60 Parliament, however, is not 
compelled to incorporate the agreement; but if it decides to do so, it cannot amend 
the text of the agreement.61 
Fourthly, Article 116, III of the Constitution62 regulates another ‘atypical’ law. The 
constitutional provision establishes a legislative process whereby additional forms 
and conditions of autonomy are granted to ordinary Regions upon their initiative. The 
State and the Region concerned must enter into an agreement, which is subsequently 
passed by both Houses with an absolute majority of their members. The proposed 
additional special forms and conditions of autonomy are only those indicated in a 
specific list of concurrent and State exclusive legislative powers. The act must comply 
with the principles on State-Regions financial relations set forth in Article 119 of the 
Constitution, after consultation with local authorities. 
Fifthly, an Act of Parliament may alter provincial boundaries and create new 
Provinces within a Region.63 In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the act does 
not require a referendum to be held, but only the advice of the councils of the 
municipalities concerned.64  
Finally, the constitution amendment act n. 1/2012 amended Article 81 of the 
Constitution and introduced a new atypical law, in accordance with the ‘Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the economic and monetary union’ (TSCG), 
signed in Brussels on 2 February 2010, and incorporated into the Italian legal 
system.65 The atypical law on budgetary parliamentary procedure is an Act of 
Parliament passed by both Houses with an absolute majority.66 The Act must comply 
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63 Article 133, I, of the Constitution. 
64 CC n. 230/2001. 
65 See law n. 114/2012. 
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with the principles related to the balance between revenues and expenditures which 
are set forth in Article 5 of the constitutional amendment act n. 1/2012.67 
§4 EXECUTIVE ORDERS AT LEGISLATIVE LEVEL 
I Decree-Laws 
84. Pursuant to Article 77 of the Constitution, Decree Laws are provisional measures with 
force of law. The Cabinet68 is allowed to enact them in extraordinary cases of 
necessity and urgency; upon the same day of their enactment, the Cabinet has to 
table them before the Houses of Parliament for their ratification. Decree-Laws must 
be ratified (i.e. turned into an Act of Parliament) within 60 days of their publication 
in the Official Gazette. Otherwise the decrees lose effect from their inception. The 
Houses of Parliament, even if dissolved, shall be specially summoned and shall 
assemble within five days of the presentation of the decree. The Houses can either 
ratify or reject the turning into law of the decree. However, Parliament may regulate 
rights and obligations arising out of non-ratified decree-laws by passing an ad-hoc 
piece of legislation.69 
85. Decree-laws may regulate all the fields reserved to primary legislation. Limitations to 
the enactment of the emergency decrees of the government can be inferred from 
the Constitution. Firstly, decree-laws may not be used where a field of legislation 
implies ministerial responsibility: these fields are reserved to parliamentary 
legislation. We can mention primary-delegated legislation, approval of budgets, Acts 
authorising the President of the Republic to ratify international treaties. Secondly, 
decree-laws may not be enacted for regulating and sanctioning rights and obligations 
arising out of non-confirmed law-decrees. Thirdly, they cannot reproduce the content 
of a non-confirmed law-decree. Finally, the content of the law-decree does not have 
to be different from that which appears in the title. 
Article 15 of Law No. 400/1988 contemplates all these hypotheses and therefore 
implements the constitutional provisions. In addition, the article states that decree-
laws cannot restore the effectiveness of provisions set aside by the Constitutional 
Court. This provision applies to ordinary laws and regional laws as well.70 It then 
introduces additional restrictions to the enactment of law-decrees, which cannot be 
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69 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
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traced back to constitutional provisions. For example, a decree law cannot be 
enacted as far as electoral matters are concerned. Nevertheless, the Constitutional 
Court acknowledged the possibility of enacting a law-decree in the electoral field.71 
The Cabinet ought to have recourse to law-decrees provided that there are 
extraordinary cases of ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency’.72 These are referred to the current 
legislative situation, and not to the legislative situation that will occur in the future.73 
The effectiveness of decree-laws is limited in time and is destined to fail if the decree 
is not confirmed within 60 days of their publication. In order to avoid the loss of effect 
of the decree, the government has fostered the practice of ‘reiterating’ the decree-
laws. This practice may be considered legitimate as long as the necessity and the 
urgency – which are the rationale of the enactment of such decree – still continue. 
On the contrary, the Constitutional Court holds that the reiteration of decree-laws is 
inconsistent with the Constitution. In fact, decree-laws can be reiterated providing 
that they are based on new extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency, which 
justify their adoption.74 
86. Parliament ratifies decrees-law by enacting a particular piece of legislation, i.e. the 
so-called legge di conversione. The Standing Orders of both Houses75 and Article 15, 
V, of Law No. 400/1988 also allow a partial ratification of the decree, as well as the 
possibility of amending its provisions. After ratification, the Act of Parliament 
becomes the source of the rules that were previously set forth by the decree. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the ratification of the law-decree cannot 
validate substantial and procedural flaws of the decree law. This means that, if the 
decree is inconsistent with the constitutional requirements upholding its enactment 
(extraordinary cases of ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency’), the decree law is unconstitutional 
and must be set aside.76 In a recent judgment, the Constitutional Court held that 
Parliament cannot amend the law-decree by inserting into it provisions which are not 
‘homogeneous’ to those contained in the law-decree as enacted by the 
Government.77 
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Finally, the Government cannot resort to decree laws when passing broad changes in 
the legal system. When the Government tried to change the territorial 
reconfiguration of provincial boundaries by decree law, the Constitutional Court held 
that such reform was unconstitutional.78 
II Legislative Decrees 
87. The Houses of Parliament may delegate the exercise of legislative powers to the 
Cabinet.79 Parliament, however, must specify principles and criteria of guidance, and 
delegate the legislative power only for limited time and well-specified subjects. 
The legislative decree concurs with the ordinary Acts of Parliament. Antinomies 
between Acts of Parliament and decree-laws are solved in accordance with the 
chronological criterion. 
88. The Act that delegates legislative powers to the Cabinet (‘enabling act’) is a statute 
enacted by Parliament.80 Legislative delegation can deal with any field of legislation. 
Limitations to the enactment of legislative decrees can be inferred from the 
Constitution. A decree may not be used where a field of legislation implies ministerial 
responsibility. We can mention the approval of budgets and financial records, the 
ratification of decree-laws, and so on.81 Fields of legislation reserved to assembly 
approval are not excluded from delegation, since there is no significant connection 
between the phenomenon of delegation and that of the assembly reserve. 
Delegation is assigned to Cabinet for a limited period of time. The Constitutional 
Court censured the practice of delaying the publication of the enabling act, in order 
to draw advantage from a period of time that is longer than that provided in the 
enabling Act.82 Delegated legislation must comply with the principles and the criteria 
set forth in the enabling act: these are usually related to the field to which the 
delegated legislation refers, and comprise all the rules that are instrumental to the 
purposes of the delegation.83 
89. The validity and the effectiveness of the legislative decree depends on the 
observance of the limits set forth by the act. The enabling Act may contain both 
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81 Article 72, IV, of the Constitution. 
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83 See Part II, Chapter 4. 
constitutional and additional limits.84 The justification of these additional limits can 
be traced back to the fact that delegated legislative power is inherently limited. 
Legislative decrees, which do not comply with the principles set forth in the enabling 
act, are inconsistent with the enabling act and therefore indirectly violate the 
Constitution.85 
III ‘Atypical’ Delegation of Legislative Powers: Legislative Decrees in the Event 
of War 
90. The President of the Republic declares war upon authorisation of Parliament,86 which 
has the authority to declare a state of war and vests the necessary powers in the 
Cabinet. It has been disputed whether the conferral of necessary powers to the 
Cabinet is a type of legislative delegation.87 It should be argued, however, that the 
assignment to the Cabinet of the necessary powers implies the assignment of 
legislative powers and can only be carried out through an Act of Parliament according 
to the paradigm of legislative delegation. This kind of delegated legislation 
constitutes ‘atypical’ delegation, because all the limitations for ordinary delegation 
(principles, guiding criteria, limited time, specified ends) are lacking. 
IV Legislative Decrees Implementing the Basic Laws of ‘Autonomous' Regions 
91. The legislative decrees implementing basic laws of ‘Autonomous Regions’ are laid 
down in the constitutional laws adopting the basic laws of the same autonomous 
regions.88 Through such legislative decrees, the regional basic laws allow the 
government to transfer the offices and government staff to the Autonomous Regions, 
and to implement, integrate, and specify basic law provisions. Whereas the object, 
the governing criteria, and principles can be implicitly derived from the regional basic 
laws, there is indication of a limited time for their enactment. Where appended, the 
temporal limit has been widely eluded.89 The temporal limit configures the delegation 
for the implementation of the special basic laws as a continuous delegation, which 
can be carried out by several acts. This tends to configure such delegation as an 
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87 Article 78 of the Constitution. 
88 Article 43 basic law for Sicily; Article 56 basic law for Sardinia, Article 107 basic law for 
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89 Article 108, I, basic law for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol. 
‘atypical’ one. Moreover, this type of delegation is ‘atypical’ because the delegation 
itself derives from a provision at the constitutional level to the exclusion of the acts 
of Parliament.90 
The procedure whereby the decrees are enacted provides for an advisory opinion or 
a proposal on the outline of the decree which formulated by State-Regions joint 
committees. The participation of joint committees in the drafting of the decrees set 
them among the ‘atypical’ sources. 
V Legislative Decrees Setting Consolidated Legislation 
92. Consolidated Acts are legislative decrees. They represent a restatement of primary 
legislation scattered over several statutes. Consolidated Acts enable previous 
primary legislation to be repealed. In order to approve Consolidated Acts, Parliament 
must delegate the necessary legislative powers to the Government. The limits of 
time, object, guiding criteria, and specific limited time can be implicitly derived from 
the function carried out by consolidated legislation. 
In some cases, Consolidated Acts cannot introduce any change in the law: the Act is 
a mere consolidation of all the law on a particular matter within one legislative decree 
(testi unici compilativi).91 The Cabinet – which normally enacts the consolidated Act 
upon parliamentary delegation – cannot amend the legislation in force.92 
§5 THE OUTCOME OF ABROGATIVE REFERENDA AS A SOURCE OF LAW 
93. Pursuant to Article 75, I, of the Constitution, the outcome of an abrogative referendum 
– i.e. the deliberation of the electoral body that totally or partially repeals a piece of 
primary legislation – enjoys a status comparable to that of primary legislation. 
Firstly, the repeal of a piece of legislation triggers changes in the legal system, and 
therefore renovates the legal system itself. Secondly, referendum promoters may 
also call for a partial repeal of legislation through referendum: partial repeals are 
aimed at carving a new law out of the text of the existing one in order to being 
submitted to the approval of the electoral body. This gives rise to a kind of lex rogata 
or popular law. 
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§6 OTHER SOURCES OF LAW AT LEGISLATIVE LEVEL 
94. The Standing Orders of Parliament, as well as the regulations and rules of procedure 
before the Constitutional Court should be considered primary legislation. Indeed, 
they are subordinate only to constitutional sources. The criterion applicable to 
conflicts between such sources of law and primary legislation is that of competence.  
I Parliamentary Standing Orders 
95. Article 64, I, of the Constitution establishes that ‘Each House adopts its own rules by 
absolute majority of its members’. Article 72, I, II, III, of the Constitution then states 
that the Houses of Parliament can set rules establishing shortened procedures for 
urgent draft legislation. In addition, standing orders set the ways in which the 
workings of committees are made public, the procedures for the consideration of 
bills. 
According to the criterion of competence, matters reserved to parliamentary 
standing of orders cannot be regulated by statutory law, but only by sources at the 
constitutional level. Conflicts between parliamentary standing orders and 
constitutional provisions can arise autonomously or may derive from an Act of 
Parliament approved in accordance with an invalid Standing Order. In both cases, the 
Constitutional Court held that Standing Orders are interna corporis acta and 
therefore their constitutional validity is unchallengeable. In this respect, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that parliamentary Standing Orders could not be subject 
to judicial review of legislation, since they do not have binding force of law.93 As 
regards laws conflicting with invalid Orders, the Act of Parliament approved in 
accordance with them should be inconsistent with the Constitution as well. However, 
the Constitutional Court held that the principle that prevents interna corporis from 
being challenged before the Constitutional Court is to be set aside only when the 
standing orders directly infringe the Constitution.94 
II Regulations and Rules of Procedure before the Constitutional Court 
96. The regulations of the Constitutional Court are provided in Article 14 of Law No. 
87/1953, i.e. in an ordinary act of Parliament, which implements the constitutional 
provisions concerning the Constitutional Court. These regulations govern the 
organisation and functioning of Constitutional Court. Additional rules of procedure 
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can be set therein.95 They are approved by the majority of members of the Court and 
published in the Official Gazette. 
As mentioned above, such regulations are set forth by an ordinary Act of Parliament. 
However, they can be considered as primary legislation. Indeed, the Court enacts 
them in the exercise of its legislative power, which can be directly traced back to the 
Constitution. In this respect, the regulations and the rules of procedure to be an 
expression of the constitutional independence of the constitutional adjudicator. As a 
consequence, Law No. 87/1953 does not create a new source of law, but simply 
acknowledges a regulatory power directly granted by the Constitution. 
In addition, limitations to the principle of constitutional autonomy of the Court 
operate either directly or through an act of primary legislation. In other words, the 
organisation and functioning of the Court is carried out by an overlapping jurisdiction, 
in which both primary legislation and regulations concur. Where primary legislation 
and regulation are inconsistent, it is the act of Parliament, which prevails. To sum up, 
the rule that has been adopted is the doctrine of the paramountcy of primary 
legislation. The Constitutional Court holds that the validity of both the regulations 
and the rules of procedure are unchallengeable before the Court itself.96 
§7 SECONDARY SOURCES 
97. Secondary legislation is hierarchically subordinate to primary legislation. It mainly 
consists of regulations enacted by the executive, which are listed in Article 17, I and 
II of Law No. 400/1988. The list is not exhaustive: the law, which is the foundation of 
subordinate legislation, allows new types of regulations to be set up. It should be 
recalled that Article 117, VI of the Constitution sets the distribution of subordinate 
legislative powers between the State and Regions. Whereas the State can enact 
regulations within the fields of its exclusive legislative jurisdiction – insofar as it does 
not devolve such power to the Regions – the power to issue by-laws is vested in the 
regions in any other matters. 
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I Executive Regulations: Rules and Regulations Supplementing Primary 
Legislation 
98. This type of regulations governs ‘the implementation of laws and legislative decrees 
and EU regulations’,97 as well as ‘the implementation and integration of laws and 
legislative decrees, in which fundamental principles are laid down, with the exclusion 
of those principles relating to subject matter reserved for regional competence.’98 
Rules and regulations supplementing primary legislation represent the paradigm of 
‘subordinate’ or ‘secondary legislation’. The extension of this concept ranges from 
supplementing legislation in the strict sense (as a specification of the legislative rules) 
to the implementation and integration of principles set forth in legislative provisions. 
II ‘Independent’ Regulations 
99. Independent regulations govern ‘subject matters where there is no regulation set by 
acts with force of law at legislative level, provided that they do not refer to subject 
matters which are in any case reserved for law.’99 
Independent regulations differ from those regulations which implement and integrate 
laws. In fact, whereas the ambit of operation of the latter is covered by fundamental 
principles set by an Act of Parliament, independent regulations provide even in the 
absence of law. The lack of law must nevertheless be interpreted both as an absence 
of an explicit legislative regulation assigning statutory power and as a presence of an 
implicit rule conferring such power. 
III Regulations Organising Public Administration 
100. Regulations governing the ‘organisation and functioning of public administration 
according to the provisions dictated by laws’100 are enacted according to Article 97, I 
of the Constitution: ‘Public offices are organised according to the provisions of law, 
so as to ensure the efficiency and impartiality of administration. The regulations of 
the offices establish the areas of competence, the duties and the responsibilities of 
the officials.’ 
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The organisational regulations represent a unique model, since they implement 
primary legislation according to constitutional principles. These regulations 
supplement the provisions of legislative provisions setting fundamental principles. 
IV ‘Authorised’ Regulations 
101. ‘Authorised’ regulations replace primary legislation under an enabling act such as 
that of Parliament. In other words, they can deregulate entire legislative ambits by 
replacing them with statutory ones, provided that the subject matter is not entirely 
reserved to primary legislation. According to Article 17, II, of Law No. 400/1988, the 
enabling act repeals the provisions at the legislative level. If the act did not foresee 
the repeal of legislative provisions, it would be inconsistent with the Constitution, 
since it cannot establish a source in competition with itself. The justifications for 
‘authorised’ regulations can hold good provided that the powers granted are precise 
and clear, and conferred on an identifiable field. The repeal of legislative provisions 
will become effective when ‘authorised’ regulation comes into force. Some 
objections have been made to the enactment of ‘authorised’ regulations. However, 
it is not the ‘authorised’ regulation which repeals primary legislation, but the act 
conferring the delegated powers. On the contrary, the ‘authorised’ regulation would 
repeal an act, which is hierarchically superior to the regulation itself. Moreover, the 
act repealing legislative norms previously in force also sets forth ‘the general rules 
regulating the subject matter’. As a consequence, the subject matter itself will be 
regulated both by the ordinary act (which sets forth the fundamental principles) and 
by the regulation (which sets forth the specific and detailed provisions). 
Article 17, IVbis of Law No. 400/1988 explicitly reserves to ‘delegated’ regulations the 
possibility to set forth the provisions regarding the organisation and functioning of 
Ministry departments and offices. In addition, the Cabinet must have recourse to 
‘delegated’ regulations for replacing legislative provisions concerning administrative 
proceedings.101 
V Regulations Implementing European Directives 
102. Regulations implementing EU Directives are ‘authorised’ regulations, which replace 
primary legislation under the authority conferred by annual acts of Parliament setting 
the proper measures for ensuring the fulfilment of EU obligations. By withdrawing 
primary legislation and replacing it with statutory instruments, these regulations 
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deregulate entire ambits which were once regulated by acts of Parliament. 
Regulations implementing EU Directives cannot be enacted when it comes to either 
establishing new administrative organs and structures or setting new expenses or 
levying less revenue. The annual act of Parliament setting the proper measures for 
ensuring the fulfilment of EU obligations directly implements EU directives setting 
new criminal indictments and administrative fines. The act identifies public 
authorities to which administrative functions related to EU law are to be assigned.102 
The Cabinet can adopt such regulations to act in substitution when Regions do not 
fulfil EU obligations.103 
VI ‘Consolidated’ Regulations 
103. Article 17, IVter of Law No. 400/1988104 allows the Cabinet to consolidate subordinate 
legislation, which is scattered over several acts. ‘Consolidated’ regulations cannot 
introduce any change in the law: they are mere consolidation of all the provisions 
enacted at a level inferior to primary legislation. 
VII Ministerial and Inter-ministerial Regulations 
104. Parliament can expressly allow one or more ministers to enact statutory instruments 
in the form of rules and regulations for supplementing the provision of an Act of 
Parliament itself.105 Through statutory instruments ministers are then allowed to 
introduce regulations that have to be consistent with powers delegated to them by 
Parliament in enabling legislation. Ministerial and Inter-ministerial Regulations must 
conform both to primary and executive subordinate legislation. As they are 
hierarchically subordinate to both primary and secondary legislation, they are ranked 
as third-level sources. 
§8 SOURCES OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY 
105. Italy is characterised by a polyarchy of political decision- and law-making entities, 
coordinated by the national order of government. This can be considered as a 
communitarian perspective of the State, useful when it comes to matching the needs 
of politico-institutional pluralism. The ‘State-as-a-community’ perspective obliterates 
the concept of sovereignty, and replaces it with a new one, which corresponds to the 
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relationships between Nation-State sovereignty (for the purpose of unification and 
inter-subjective coordination) and autonomy (i.e., the power of the subjects of 
pluralism to self-organise and self-regulate). 
Regional and local autonomy impacts on legislative law-making. In this respect, 
autonomy entails the constitutional distribution of legislative power between the 
national authority and sub-national authorities. As a consequence, subnational units 
have the capability of enacting acts and regulations that are part of the legal system. 
‘Autonomous’ sources include regional and local sources. It should be recalled that 
both systems of sources have been profoundly modified by three constitutional 
amendments, which radically changed the constitutional design as regards 
intergovernmental relations (between the State, the Regions and, to a lesser extent, 
the municipalities), regional and local sources of law, and the structure of 
government within the Regions.106 
I Sources of Law at Regional Level 
106. Legislation at the regional level comprises regional basic laws, regional laws, and 
regional regulations.107 Abrogative referenda can be held ‘on the laws and 
administrative measures of the Region’ and therefore on regional regulations. 
Abrogative referenda on regional laws and regulations are set at the primary or 
subordinate legislation level accordingly.108 
II Basic Laws of the ‘Ordinary’ Regions 
107. ‘Ordinary’ Regions are allowed to enact their own basic laws by passing an act at the 
legislative level. Basic laws must determine the frame of government and the 
fundamental principles of organisation and functioning of the Region in accordance 
with the Constitution. In addition, they define how to table bills before regional 
legislatures and how to hold abrogative referenda on regional laws and 
administrative decisions. Furthermore, they regulate the forms of publication of 
regional laws and regulations.109 Finally, basic laws regulate the ‘council of local 
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government’, which is a consultative body between the Region and local 
authorities.110 
Basic laws of the Ordinary Regions are passed according to an entrenched procedure, 
introduced by constitutional amendment act No. 1/1999. Regional legislatures pass 
them with an act approved with an absolute majority of their members, with two 
subsequent deliberations at an interval of not less than two months. This act does 
not require the approval of the Cabinet commissioner. However, the Cabinet can 
challenge its constitutional validity before the Constitutional Court within thirty days 
of their publication. 
‘Ordinary’ Regions enjoy a degree of constitutional autonomy that is higher than that 
conferred to ‘autonomous’ regions. In this respect, the so-called autonomous 
Regions had their own ‘basic law’ (statuto) approved by a constitutional law of the 
State, without any significant participation or influence of regional Legislatures.111 
Nevertheless, under constitutional act No. 2/2001, special regional basic laws can be 
partially turned into ‘regional’ basic laws with regard to the form of government and 
the electoral system. The regional act amending the form of government and the 
electoral system must be approved by an absolute majority of the members of the 
regional legislature. This act can be submitted to popular referendum if a certain 
figure of the regional electors or of the members of the Regional Council so request. 
III Relationships between Regional Basic Laws and the State and Regional 
Sources 
108. The relations between regional basic laws and state law are governed according to 
the criterion of competence. Furthermore, regional basic laws regulate only those 
specific fields of legislation which the Constitution confers upon them. We define 
such fields of legislation as reserved matters: pursuant to Article 123 of the 
Constitution, the form of government and the basic principles of organisation can 
only be regulated by regional basic laws to the exclusion of State ordinary laws.112 In 
a recent judgement, however, the Constitutional Court held that regional basic laws 
have to be consistent with national framework legislation falling under the 
concurrent legislation.113 Regional basic laws are pieces of primary legislation and 
must regulate those contents referred to in Article 123 of the Constitution. In fact, 
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they must contain provisions regarding the right to table bills before regional 
legislatures and promote abrogative referenda on laws and administrative measures 
of the Region as well as the publication of laws and regional regulations.114 With 
regard to its formal effectiveness, regional Statutes (i.e. the regional statutory act) 
are hierarchically superior to other regional laws.115 
IV Regional Laws 
109. Regional laws are enacted by regional legislatures in accordance with the 
Constitution, the basic regional laws and the standing orders of Regional Legislatures. 
Although regional legislatures enjoy different degrees of legislative powers,116 
regional laws may be considered as a unitary category. In fact, all regional laws have 
the same nomen juris (i.e. the same legal definition: ‘regional law’) and are passed 
according to the same legislative process. They share common features as far their 
contents and constitutional limits are concerned. 
Before the 2001 constitutional reform, ‘ordinary’ Regions only had a limited 
legislative power in specific fields listed in the national Constitution. The 
constitutional amendment act No. 3/2001 led to a reversal in the distribution of 
legislative powers: the State maintains exclusive legislative power on a limited 
number of matters117 and Regions are vested with implied powers in all subject 
matters not expressly covered by State legislation.118 
In this respect, the current distribution of powers between the State and regions is a 
reconfiguration of former State-Regions relationships. Whereas former Article 117 
allowed regions to make laws providing that there was a constitutional foundation 
for their legislative powers, now regional legislative powers encounter only those 
limitations deriving from the existence of a subject matter reserved to State 
legislative powers.119 The State, however, has exclusive legislative powers in the 
subject matters listed in Article 117, II, of the Constitution. This list covers subject 
matters that traditionally are prerogative of the central State, in order to preserve 
the legal and economic unity of the Republic. Apart from exclusive legislative powers, 
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the State may make laws in relations to the subject matters indicated in the list of 
specified heads of legislative concurrent powers. Article 117, III, of the Constitution 
lists the subject matters covered by concurrent legislation: legislative powers are 
vested in the Regions, except for the determination of the fundamental principles, 
which are laid down in State legislation. A regional law, which does not comply with 
such fundamental principles set forth in the State legislation, is deemed to be 
inconsistent with the State legislation and the Constitution as well.120 
The Constitutional Court stated that State legislation – which is still in force in those 
fields that are now devolved to regional legislation – might apply until Regional 
Legislatures ‘cover’ the same field with their laws. The legal effects of the ‘covering 
the field’ test are those typical of pre-emption.121 Article 1, III of Law No. 131/2003 
holds the same assumption. 
Several important rulings rendered by the Constitutional Court after the 2001 
constitutional reform had highly centripetal effects, thus developing an ever more 
centralistic doctrine. In the opinion of the Court, the principle of subsidiarity (Article 
118, I, of the Constitution) allows the State to absorb regional legislative powers if 
there is the necessity to comply with the national concern.122 Furthermore, it must 
be reminded that the reform only addressed ordinary Regions, but did not have a 
direct impact on the competences of ‘special’ Regions, whose powers still derive from 
their basic laws. Moreover, Article 10 of constitutional act No. 3/2001 establishes 
that, as long as the autonomous Regions do not change their basic laws, the broader 
forms of legislative autonomy set out in Title V of the Constitution, applies to them 
as well. In other words, the legislative powers of ‘special’ Regions can be considered 
as the outcome of the intersection of often overlapping and contradicting catalogues 
set forth in both the Constitution and their own basic laws.  
V ‘Atypical’ Regional Laws 
110. Among ‘atypical’ regional laws we number those concerning the regrouping of 
municipalities, which depart from the ordinary legislative procedure. Pursuant to 
Article 133, II of the Constitution, Regions may establish new Municipalities within 
their own territory and modify their districts and denominations. Laws establishing 
new municipalities and modifying their districts and denominations are leggi-
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provvedimento (i.e. legislative measures). They are approved by Regional legislatures 
‘after consultation with the populations concerned,’ which means that a referendum 
must be summoned.123 Regional legislatures can either receive or reject the proposed 
change approved by the electorate.124 Whatever the legal nature of the referendum 
may be, it is hard to imagine that the representative body would disregard the will of 
the people. Although the State can determine the fundamental principles of 
organisation and functioning of municipalities, the Constitutional Court strongly 
affirmed that the State cannot not interfere with the regional exclusive jurisdiction 
over territorial regrouping.125 
111. The 2001 constitutional amendments introduced new regional ‘atypical’ laws as well. 
Under Article 117, VIII, of the Constitution, regional laws ratify agreements reached 
by a region with another region aimed at the better exercise of their functions. 
Pursuant to Article 117, IX, of the Constitution, Regions ratify agreements with 
foreign States and understandings with territorial entities that belong to foreign 
states in the areas falling within their responsibilities. Finally, the basic laws of 
‘ordinary’ regions introduced entrenched laws, such as financial records and laws 
adopting regional electoral systems.126  
VI Regional Acts with Force of Law 
112. Regions cannot enact decree-laws or legislative decrees. An act with force of law is 
that stemming from an abrogative referendum. Moreover, regional basic laws 
introduced new kinds of regional acts with force of law. Among them, we can 
mention the consolidated acts, which are approved by Regional legislatures. The 
standing orders of Regional legislatures are not sources of law.127 
VII Regional Regulations 
113. Regional regulatory powers have been comprehensively modified by the 
constitutional amendment acts No. 1/1999 and No. 3/2001. Article 121, II, of the 
Constitution originally vested Regional legislatures with regulatory powers. The 
constitution amendment act No. 3/2001 replaced Article 121, II of the Constitution 
without indicating which organ (either the legislature or the executive) should 
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exercise regulatory powers. The Constitutional Court holds that regional basic laws 
are free to allot regulatory powers either to the legislature or to the executive.128 
Moreover, regulatory powers shall be vested in the Regions with respect to the subject 
matters where they have legislative powers (i.e. exclusive and concurrent legislative 
powers). Under Article 116, VI of the Constitution, the State can delegate Regions to 
enact regulations in fields assigned to the Constitution. 
Regional basic laws can set the same regulations envisaged at the State level: rules and 
regulations supplementing primary legislation; regulations organising public 
administration; ‘delegated’ regulations; regulations implementing European 
directives. The relationships between regulations and regional laws are governed 
according to the hierarchical principle. Regulations may be subjected to regional 
abrogative referenda. The relationships between regional sources and regulations 
delegated from the State to Regions under Article 116, VI of the Constitution are 
governed in accordance with the criterion of competence. 
VIII Local Sources of law: Municipal, Metropolitan, and Provincial Basic Laws 
114. Pursuant to Article 114, II, of the Constitution, Municipalities, metropolitan cities 
and provinces shall enact their own basic laws in accordance with the principles laid 
down in the Constitution. Municipal, metropolitan, and provincial basic laws set their 
internal organisation in order to fulfil the duties assigned to them. Local basic laws have 
to be approved by a majority of two-thirds of the Councillors; if such a majority is not 
achieved, two subsequent deliberations with an absolute majority will be required.129 
Secondly, the law indicates which subject matters have to be regulated by the basic 
laws.130 Furthermore, it indicates the subject matters where the intervention of the 
basic law is optional.131 Metropolitan cities enjoy an even broader sphere of autonomy, 
and their basic laws are enacted in accordance with Law No. 56/2014.  
The organisation of the local government is a matter reserved to basic laws under the 
enabling legislation such as the local government acts No. 267/2000 and No. 56/2014. 
However, primary legislation cannot interfere with the constitutional autonomy of 
local authorities set forth in Article 114, II of the Constitution, which expressly protects 
the self-organisation of municipalities and provinces and the adoption of local basic 
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laws. Furthermore, local basic laws regulate only those specific fields of legislation 
conferred by the Constitution: to this extent, they are ‘limited’ sources. Article 6.2 of 
the Consolidated Act No. 267/2000 states that local basic laws must be comply with 
the principles established by the law. 
IX Municipal and Provincial By-laws 
115. Under Article 117, VI, of the Constitution, local regulations are enacted as by-laws. 
Indeed, Municipalities, Provinces, and Metropolitan Cities are granted regulatory 
powers for the organisation and implementation of the functions attributed to them. 
Local regulations are typical examples of subordinate legislation, which implements 
national and regional primary legislation. The nature of local regulations is twofold. On 
the one hand, they implement State and Regions statutory provisions regarding local 
organisation (so-called organisational by-laws). On the other hand, regulations are 
hierarchically subordinate to State and regional laws. In addition, they supplement 
State and regional laws concerning the exercise of local functions in accordance with 
Articles 7 of the Consolidated Act No. 267/2000 and 4, IV of Law No. 131/2003 and the 
principle of competence. Hence, regulations accommodate State and regional 
legislation to local needs. According to the principle of competence, State and regional 
regulations cannot interfere in the ambits reserved to local by-laws. To this extent, 
Article 4, II of the general provisions of the civil code – according to which regulations 
of authorities other than the government may not be inconsistent with executive 
regulations – must be considered repealed. 
§9 LABOUR AGREEMENTS 
I Collective Agreements Under Article 39 of the Constitution 
116. Article 39, IV, of the Constitution provided for collective labour agreements 
‘having mandatory effects for all workers belonging to the categories referred to in the 
agreement’: these were called collective labour agreements with erga omnes 
effectiveness. In order to enter into these agreements, the Constitution states that the 
contracting trade unions must have been registered at the local or central offices, 
according to the provisions of the law. The Constitution also sets a condition for their 
registration: their by-laws must frame their internal organisation after democratic 
character. Moreover, the stipulation of the contract must be entrusted to a single 
representative body made up in proportion to the number of registered members of 
the various stipulating unions.132 In the event of inconsistency between primary 
legislation and labour agreements, it is the primary legislation which prevails. 
II Private-Law Collective Agreements 
117. Article 39 of the Constitution has never been implemented. As a consequence, 
labour relations are regulated by rules laid down in private-law collective agreements, 
which bind only workers belonging to the unions that stipulated the agreements. 
Nevertheless, private-law collective agreements had their binding force extended 
beyond the contracting parties, achieving quasi-erga omnes effectiveness. Moreover, 
primary legislation133 and the judiciary referred to private-law collective agreements 
for regulating labour relations, thus extending the guarantees the Constitution grants 
to workers.134 
Relationships between statutory law and private-law collective agreements are 
governed by the same criteria applied for solving antinomies between primary 
legislation and erga omnes collective agreements. In the event of inconsistency, 
primary legislation prevails over the agreement. 
§10 TRADE CUSTOMS REFERRED TO IN LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
118. Customs directly envisaged by the Italian legal system are the so-called usi (trade 
customs). Under the general provisions of the civil code, they apply providing that laws 
and regulations expressly refer thereto.135 Trade custom is therefore placed on the last 
rung of the hierarchical ladder, as a third- or fourth-level source: they must be 
consistent with primary and subordinate legislation, and with ministerial and inter-
ministerial regulations as well. 
As mentioned above, there is no room for contra legem customary sources within the 
Italian legal system, but only for secundum and praeter legem customary rules. 
Trade customs must be collected in a special Official Gazette. Customary rules 
contained therein are deemed to exist unless it is otherwise proven.136 The publication 
in those collections does not guarantee either the existence of the custom or the 
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correspondence of the collection itself to the customary rules in force. The parties will 
have to prove the existence of the custom and the custom rule. The judiciary cannot 
use the iura novit curia principle, and therefore shall decide on the fact, the law and its 
source. 
 
